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Abstract
Tasks, tools, and techniques that we perform, use, and acquire, define the elements of expertise
which we value as the hallmarks of goal-driven behavior. Somehow, the creation of tools enables us to
define new tasks, or is it that the envisioning of new tasks drives us to invent new tools? Or maybe it is
that new tools engender new techniques which then result in new tasks? This jumble of issues will be
explored and discussed in this diverse collection of papers. Individually, few of the papers are related to
each other by topic or by techniques of analysis. Collectively, all focus on tasks performed using tools
and discuss the techniques of tool use which enable differences in performance and expertise across
individuals, societies, and (even) species.
Keywords: Animal tool use; Constructing expertise; Extreme expertise; Varieties of artifacts; Teaming
with your car; Brain; Mental imagery for motor acts; Foragers and their tools; Gestures; Tool embodi-
ment; Spatial perception
1. Overview
Tasks, tools, and techniques—our daily lives are so enmeshed in these that it is some-
times hard to see our forest for our trees. Just as speaking is cognitively a different act
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than is writing, so writing with a feather quill is both mechanically and cognitively differ-
ent from writing with a pencil which is different in both ways from writing with an old
Underwood typewriter which is different in many ways from writing with Microsoft Word
on a modern computer which is very different for users of LaTeX. Of course, this is not
to imply that the medium is the message as, in this case, it is not. Rather, the message is
that we used to pause in some places not just to gather-our-thoughts but to take one page
out of the typewriter and insert a blank page in. How much was our “attention to writing”
devoted to keeping our quill-point sharp and our wet-ink blotted? When the typist paused to
grab hold of the carriage-return lever and return it to the left-side of the typewriter, were
those pause-times wasted in a merely mechanical action or was that time used to gather
our thoughts and reflect, if ever so slightly, on our manuscript? That is, did such subtle
differences in the tools of typewriting result in changes to cognition? While typing is a
convenient example, the broader issue is whether and, if so, how our tools and our tech-
niques for using our tools influence the products of our cognition? There are many ways
of answering this question, and our 11 authors ask and answer it in, at least, 11 different
ways.
The papers in this topic were written by researchers with a common interest in tool use—
but the specifics of their research foci varies vastly from one research group to another. One
paper brings a dynamic systems perspective to driver behavior that is all about being a part
of the tool of car driving (Morris, Craig, & Mirman, 2021). Another worries about whether
the evolution of symbolic language and tool use was independent or dependent on each other,
and if so, whether the traces of these developments still remain in the human brain (Osiurak,
Cretel, Uomini, Lesourd, & Reynaud, 2021). A third takes a cognitive psychology perspective
to examine what our tools for professional sports, eating dinner, and other daily activities tell
us about the role of expertise in tool embodiment (Weser & Proffitt, 2021). Another seeks
to map the conceptual landscape of relations between the embodied mind and various arti-
facts (Heersmink, 2021). Yet another (Sterelny, 2021) explores the subsistence technology of
forager communities in a discussion that evokes the stories of William Buckley and his life
among the Australian aborigines in the early 1800s.1 Another takes an expertise perspective
to explore how the techniques that individuals develop for using the tools of Tetris lead some
players to short, deadend plateaus while enabling others to leap to the next level of skill (Gray
& Banerjee, 2021).
The above list of topics is not our limit. Others of our researchers find that blind cane
users feel the curb not the cane itself and that tennis players feel the racket as a part of
their body (Witt, 2021). One group of contributors is dismayed by the state-of-the-art in
research on animal tool use and propose a very interesting reboot of that field (Colbourne,
Auersperg, Lambert, Huber, & Volter, 2021). Another targets her report on “gestures as
thinking tools” (Tversky, 2021). Lastly at the ultimate end of this list, the last paper we
introduce here argues that our bodies are the ultimate tool (Rosenbaum, 2021) and that the
key to understanding our use of more physical tools is to study the brain’s control of the
body.
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2. A paper-by-paper introduction to our topics
2.1. Non-human tool use: Overrated or poorly defined?
The authors Colbourne et al. (2021) lead us into an important subfield of tool use in which
a debate rages over what seems a reasonable proposal to address misconceptions regarding
animal tool use by attempting to rationalize the rules of evidence. Our authors favor adopting
the tooling (Fragaszy & Mangalam, 2018) framework to separate tool-use from non-tool-use
activities in nonhuman animals. This framework views tooling as a specific category of tool
use actions, which excludes actions, such as throwing or dropping a stone to break an egg,
from this body-plus-object system. Colbourne et al. survey all tool-use examples documented
by Shumaker, Walkup, and Beck (2011) and find that tooling appears to be phylogenetically
less widespread than tool use with the variability being greatest in the primate order. Interest-
ingly, the concept of tooling refers to an embodied process, which seems very close to some
of the ideas presented by Weser and Proffitt (2021).
2.2. Varieties of artifacts: Embodied, perceptual, cognitive, and affective
Richard Heersmink maps the conceptual landscape of relations between embodied minds
and various kinds of artifacts. Based on their functional properties, he identifies four cat-
egories of artifacts, namely motor, perceptual, cognitive, and affective artifacts. Embodied
artifacts (e.g., hammers) are absorbed in the body schema and can feel like transparent exten-
sions of the motor system. Perceptual artifacts (e.g., night vision goggles) are used to help
us perceive or quantify the world better. They do so by correcting or amplifying our sensory
capacities or by making visible and quantifying aspects of our world. Cognitive artifacts (e.g.,
maps) functionally contribute to performing a cognitive task such as, for example, navigat-
ing. Finally, affective artifacts (e.g., paintings) have the capacity to alter the affective state of
the agent. These categories of artifacts do not have clear boundaries, but sometimes overlap.
Mapping the landscape of relations between embodied minds and various kinds of artifacts
provides us with a broader picture of humans as tool users, showing how humans use artifacts
to achieve their aims, complete their tasks, and regulate their emotions. Heersmink’s paper
ends by identifying a number of trends regarding the use of these types of artifacts, focusing
on neuroprosthetics, brain–computer interfaces, and personalization algorithms.
2.3. Expertise in tool use promotes tool embodiment
Veronica Weser and Dennis Profitt examine the curious but well-accepted phenomena that
frequent use of a tool often results in it feeling as an extension of the hands or other body
parts which use the tool. The more expert the user, the more intense this feeling. Hence, the
often-used example of the blind walker’s cane feels, to its blind walker, as if the tip of the cane
is sensing the various up and downs of the path or smoothness or unevenness of the terrain.
Indeed, according to Weser and Profitt, the cane allows blind users, “to integrate auditory
and tactile information as they touch the area immediately in front of them with the cane’s
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tip.” Perhaps even curiouser, the more expert the tool user is in using her tool, for example, a
fencer’s personal epee, the greater the discomfort felt when asked to use an unfamiliar epee.
To a novice an epee is just a fancy name for a sword, but to the expert her personal epee is
an extension of her arm. The last sentence of their paper stresses the importance of bringing
the expertise perspective to tool use while also providing an apt summation of the authors’
conclusions: namely “Expert effects in the tool-use literature signal the ways in which experts
embody their tools in a manner more pronounced then has typically been documented in tool-
use studies that do not employ experts” (Weser & Proffitt, 2021).
2.4. The expertise approach applied to Tetris: The limit is not the tool, but the techniques
In common with Weser and Profitt, Wayne Gray and Sounak Banerjee also adopt the exper-
tise approach but their task is the classic game of NES Tetris. Simple objects do not imply
simple techniques. For example, knowing the right technique to weave the right material could
make all the difference in your ability to make a fishing net to feed your group. Likewise, if
you were a NES Tetris player from the 1990s up until sometime in the 2010s, it is likely
that your Tetris level of play had an upper limit of level 18 or, at the most, level 19. Today
that limit is level 30 with recent discoveries (Macdonald, 2021), once mastered, expected to
exceed that level. However, in their paper Gray and Banerjee do not focus on the extreme
experts of the Tetris world but on a dataset of 492 students who played Tetris under labo-
ratory conditions in which each move of a Tetris zoid was rated in terms of 35 features of
Tetris play. The data were then teased and tortured until they revealed their structure to an
exploratory factor analysis and then attacked with logistic regression tools to reveal changes
in skill with expertise. Finally, the tools of linear-regression modeling were applied to deter-
mine structural differences among players at the same levels of expertise. The result is a study
of how expertise is constructed not in one leap but by many tiny explorations and adjustments
as new skills emerge.
2.5. Tool use affects spatial perception
In contrast to the two papers just introduced, Jessica Witt avoids on expertise per se to focus
on the impact of virtual tools on spatial perception.
The Pong effect uses variations on the video game “Pong” and manipulates changes in
paddle size to affect subjects’ ability to block the virtual ball. One of the important and inter-
esting aspects of this work is that changes in paddle size affect not just the players’ likelihood
of hitting the ball, but their estimate of the speed of the ball. Smaller balls were perceived
as moving faster than larger ones. Witt’s paper presents a detailed account of the various
alternative hypotheses she and her collaborators considered and the various experiments they
conducted which ruled out most of them.2
In general, the paper provides a readable and personal history of the development of
research and theory in how tools change the “action capabilities” of people. We especially
appreciated her discussion of J. J. Gibson’s work (e.g., Gibson, 1933, 1941, 1977). Although
Gibson stressed the importance of perception for action, he considered the main role of
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perception to be the perception of possibilities for action, not spatial perception per se. We
also liked her mention, almost in passing, of her very recent and, unfortunately, all too timely,
discussion of how the nature of an object affects its perception. In that study, the task varied
between identifying a gun being held versus identifying other objects. As she tells us, “When
the object shown in the photograph was a shoe, participants were slower and less accurate
to identify it when the participants held a gun than when they held a spatula (Witt et al.,
2020). Wielding a gun makes a person a shooter, and shooters had a harder time identifying
non-guns in the photographs.”
2.6. Coevolution of tool behavior and language
François Osiurak, Caroline Crétel, Natalie Uomini, Chloé Bryche, Mathieu Lesourd, and
Emanuelle Reynaud pursue the “shared neurocognitive processes hypothesis,” which main-
tains that it was “the emergence of the combinatorial component of language skills” that
“made possible the complexification of tool-making skills.” This technical-reasoning hypoth-
esis posits that reasoning, starting at a technical level, “creates a representation of the mechan-
ical action appropriate to solve a physical problem.” This representation biases the selection
of motor actions that are used to realize the mechanical action.” Interestingly, by this frame-
work, manipulation knowledge is not needed to use tools.
The exploratory nature of their research is complemented by an extraordinary array of
Supporting Information which provide a large, if not exhaustive, listing of 125 studies for
the brain areas investigated in their paper (to be clear, this listing is in addition to the 126
references included in the Reference section of their paper). While we seldom become excited
by such catalogs, in this case the listings emphasize the importance of the left posterior and
parietal areas for an extraordinary number of cognitive tasks. Perhaps we are making a classic
where there is smoke there is fire mistake but this listing, in addition to the references cited,
increases our confidence in their association between language skills and the development of
tool-making skills.
2.7. Driven to learn
One of the editors of this topic recently replaced his 15 year old car with a new one.
Whereas his old car had a “cruise control,” his new car has an “advanced driver assistance
system” (ADAS) such as the ones discussed by Morris, Craig, and Mirman. During long
drives on low traffic, three lanes in both directions, Interstate Highways, if left to itself (e.g.,
while the driver is listening to a podcast), the ADAS will gradually slow down to a cruising
speed which matches the overly cautious car in the lane ahead (this “feature” is referred to
by our authors as ACC or adaptive cruise control). Hence, before he knows it, our human
driver (with ADAS) is driving 10 mph below the posted limit and his 90-min drive begins to
turn into a 2-h one. Is this horrible? Well, of course not, but when asked, the driver reports
that, all else equal, he would gladly abandon ADAS and return to the much more primitive
(but predictable) cruise control on his previous, 15+-year-old car—a system that requires the
driver to continually monitor the distance between his car and the car immediately ahead in
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the same lane. On the other hand, these “dislikes” do not seem to be the inevitable result of
“technology meets the nanny state.” Rather, they seem more like a phase which our car tech-
nology (and drivers) are passing through. Hence, we are very hopeful that the Morris, Craig,
and Mirman team will continue their research and continue working with their engineers so
that our technology meets not just our needs but, also, our desires.
2.8. Foragers and their tools: Risk, technology, and complexity
Sterelny provides us with the details of a world that some of us never suspected existed.
Namely a detailed look at ancient and modern foragers and the ways in which their lives were
shaped by risk, technology, and complexity. The paper focuses on the late Holocene, which
began approximately 11,650 years before the present and continues to this day. Spanning the
breath of this era, Sterelny covers the beginnings of the Holocene from the ancient record
as well as data collected from modern foragers living in the Canadian north or the Ju/’hoan
Bushmen from Namibia.3
An interesting feature of Sterelny’s paper is his discussion of the trio of tasks, tools, and
techniques. The original fishhooks were not barbed. Which great genius was it who added
the first barb to her fish hook? Would we call this the invention of a new tool? Or was it the
discovery of a new technique? Can a technique be invented for a tool that does not yet exist?
Or is it simply that every tool ever invented required an idea of how it would be used if it
were made?
2.9. Thinking tools: Gestures change thought about time
Barbara Tversky starts her paper by playfully suggesting that, as a species, we change our
name from Homo sapiens to Homo faber, the toolmaker or designer—we are a species that
“makes an enormous variety of tools, primarily with our hands, and those tools make arti-
facts that enhance our well-being.” Tversky’s focus is on our cognitive tools, among which
she includes gestures, language, and graphics. Interestingly, when it comes to representa-
tional gestures, form follows function; that is, gestures that signal a given action often mimic
that action.
Four experiments are presented. All entail simple manipulations each of which has sur-
prisingly strong effects. If the data were not so clear it would be hard to imagine that such
simple manipulations, gesturing one way or another, could have such strong effects. Tversky
has written a simple but incisive paper that deserves a deep reading.
2.10. The ultimate tool
David Rosenbaum leads us in an intellectual romp which starts with the assertion that the
body itself “can be regarded as the ultimate tool.” Hence, body movements can be regarded
as tools for manipulating the body. This is an interesting, different, and fun way of thinking
about familiar issues. Indeed if the ultimate tool is the brain and body, then we should be
concerned with the two foundational issues which Rosenbaum addresses: namely choices
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which are made with reference to motor imagery but without necessarily executing the move
(Jeannerod, 1994, 2017) and choices based on evaluating candidate postures with respect to
how well each posture satisfies current needs. The favored model does not use motor imagery
or full simulation to “determine whether it would be wise to move one way or another. Rather,
critical features of candidate positions, and critical features of candidate movements, are used
to plan the acts to be performed.”
Rosenbaum’s view has interesting consequences. For example, if the set of features which
are used to plan single displacements for a single limb are also used to plan “entire sequences
of limb and body acts” than it may well be that distinct features do not just provide the core
elements of perception, they also provide the core elements of action.
3. Summary
Tasks, tools, and techniques … the serial order of these three terms implies a logic that may
or may not be supported by all authors in this special issue on tool use. Does the tool define
or delimit the techniques by which it is used? Or, do the techniques determine the nature
of the tool? Tools are simple! Techniques are discoverable or, maybe, inventable. Time and
time again, even simple, 1-h long psychology laboratory studies lead individual subjects to
discover new techniques for using simple tools to perform simple tasks.
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Notes
1 See Henrich (2020) and McDonald (2021).
2 Of course, any discussion of the video game Pong, brings to mind the classic book,
Pilgrim in the Microworld, by the famed ethnomethodologist, David Sudnow (1983).
3 Note that one editor remarks that he found the background provided by Chapter 2, of
Joseph Henrich’s (2020) book, The WEIRDest People in the World, aided in understand-
ing some aspects of Sterelny’s paper. That chapter begins with the story of William Buck-
ley who in 1802, after deserting the Royal Navy, lived his next 25 years with members
of the Wathaurung tribe of Australian aborigines.
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